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“Since the time of Brown, what might be called the paradox of progress 
has played out in our schools. Our students have made enormous 
progress, and yet the rising significance of education in the global 
economy has made America’s large achievement gaps so much more 
consequential.” 
 
- U.S. Department of Education Secretary, Arne Duncan, 20141  
I. INTRODUCTION 
On May 20, 2014, U.S. Department of Education Secretary Arne Duncan met 
with journalists at the Education Writers Association Annual Conference in 
Nashville, Tennessee to discuss the landmark Supreme Court decision, Brown v. 
Board of Education.2 Duncan outlined various new initiatives such as the Preschool 
for All Plan and President Obama’s Connect Ed initiative in addition to identifying 
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 1 Arne Duncan, Sixty Years after Brown, Where is the Outrage?, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. 
(May 20, 2014), http://www.ed.gov/news/speeches/sixty-years-after-brown-where-outrage. 
 2 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
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four reasons why Brown remains important. First, Duncan asserted that de facto 
school segregation remains and has worsened in some instances since Brown. 
Second, he argued that without Brown, there would be no education policy targeted 
to students with disabilities (e.g., the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act) or 
from economically disadvantaged backgrounds (e.g., Title I of the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act). Duncan also noted that “educational opportunity” as 
espoused in Brown required a more nuanced, collective understanding of the link 
between a quality education and the opportunity for success, particularly in the lives 
of Black and economically disadvantaged students post-Brown. Finally, Duncan 
hearkened back to a theme recurrent in his previous public addresses: that access to a 
quality education remains an unresolved “civil rights” issue and contributes to the 
inability to close the achievement gap between White/Asian students and 
Black/Hispanic students.   
For educational policy pertaining to the achievement gains of students, in 
particular for students who are Black or Hispanic and/or enrolled at low-performing 
schools, the assertion that a “paradox of progress” post-Brown exists is well-
founded. In the 2014 report from the National Center for Education Statistics 
(reporting on four-year on-time graduation rates for all students for school years 
(SY) 2010-11 and 2011-12), the estimated national four-year adjusted cohort 
graduation rate (ACGR) was at seventy-nine and eighty percent, respectively.3 For 
SY 2010-11, American Indian/Alaska Native, Black, and Hispanic students had 
four-year ACGRs below the national average at sixty-five, sixty-seven, and seventy-
one percent, respectively.4 Similarly, for SY 2011-12, American Indian/Alaska 
Native, Black, and Hispanic students had a four-year ACGR below the national 
average at sixty-seven, sixty-nine, and seventy-three percent, respectively.5 
Graduation rates are even lower for economically disadvantaged students, students 
with limited English proficiency, and students with disabilities.6 As we reflect upon 
the sixtieth anniversary of Brown, it is critical to not only assess policies advanced 
during the Obama administration that are aimed at reducing the continuing disparity 
for minority and economically disadvantaged students, but to also reflect upon what 
Secretary Duncan called the paradox of educational progress that continues to 
persist. 
Part II explores the effort to realize Brown’s promise of integration and equal 
educational opportunity. It describes a slow but significant history of gains, which 
has since been thwarted as Brown has been rendered doctrinally impotent. It then 
considers the relationship between Brown and Title I of the Elementary and Second 
Education Act (ESEA), and suggests ways to give new life to Brown’s promise of 
equal educational opportunity. Part III examines a recent effort by the Obama 
                                                                                                                                         
 3 NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOL FOUR-YEAR ON-TIME 
GRADUATION RATES & EVENT DROPOUT RATES: SCHOOL YEARS 2010-11 AND 2011-12 (2014), 
available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2014/2014391/. 
 4 Id.  
 5 Id.  
 6 For SY 2010-11, economically disadvantaged students, students with limited English 
proficiency, and students with disabilities all had 4-year ACGR rates below the national 
average for all students at 72, 59, and 61 percent. For SY 2011-2012, the 4-year ACGR rates 
were also below the national average (at 72, 59, and 61 percent, respectively).  
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administration to increase educational opportunity for Title I schools that serve 
primarily economically disadvantaged and Black/Hispanic students through use of 
School Improvement Grants (SIG). It then outlines the eligibility requirements for 
Title I and Title I-eligible schools, mandated school improvement models for 
turnaround contingent upon SIG-funding, and new provisions for school leadership. 
Part IV considers the preliminary results associated with SIG grant-funding for 
Cohorts I and II, with a particular focus given to Cohorts I and II in the State of Ohio 
using data collected by the U.S. and Ohio Departments of Education. Finally, Part V 
concludes with a critique of the turnaround models attached to SIG grant funding 
and suggests a revised approach to school reform that would revitalize Brown’s 
promise of equal educational opportunity.   
II. BROWN IN AN AGE OF RESEGREGATION 
A.  Brown Enfeebled 
Decennial anniversaries of Brown v. Board of Education were once occasions for 
a mixture of celebration and hopeful anticipation of future gains in achieving its 
goals of equal educational opportunity and school integration. Regrettably, recent 
decennial anniversaries have been far less happy and hopeful moments. We still have 
reason to celebrate the decision. We honor the extraordinary accomplishment of the 
NAACP lawyers who mounted the extended litigation campaign that finally 
culminated in Brown and Bolling v. Sharpe.7 We remember the courage and 
determination of the parents and students who challenged state-enforced school 
segregation. Moreover, we recognize the importance of Brown and the campaign in 
the courts against segregation as part of a broader movement to transform race 
relations in America, as well as a source of legal and moral authority for other rights 
movements and the expansion of rights consciousness.8  Indeed, Brown’s place of 
honor in American law, while sometimes challenged by critics, seems secure. As 
Professor Jack Balkin has argued, no normative theory of constitutional 
interpretation can gain standing in the legal academy if it does not accommodate 
Brown.9 Balkin writes, “[w]e reject its rightness on penalty of being thought 
deliberately provocative or off-the-wall.”10 
Yet, disappointment and the recognition of hopes unfulfilled have long ago 
displaced celebration as the dominant tone at Brown anniversaries, including this 
year. It is important to remember that Brown has made a difference, as we also 
acknowledge that it is now in retreat. In the face of Southern resistance and minimal 
federal support, desegregation made little progress in the first decade after Brown. In 
1964, only Texas and Tennessee had more than two percent of their African-
                                                                                                                                         
 7 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
 8 The debate about Brown’s causal impact is beyond the scope of this article. See 
generally MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS:  THE SUPREME COURT AND 
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 344-442 (2004); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW 
HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 40-156 (2d ed. 2008). We believe that 
Brown, coupled with congressional and executive action was critical to effect desegregation. 
 9 Jack M. Balkin, What Brown Teaches Us About Constitutional Theory, 90 VA. L. REV. 
1537, 1576 (2004). 
 10 Id. 
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American students enrolled in integrated schools.11 By the mid-sixties, however, 
momentum had changed. For a brief period all three branches of the federal 
government worked in tandem to integrate de jure segregated schools. Prodded by 
President Lyndon Johnson, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964.12 In 
addition to outlawing discrimination in public accommodations and employment, the 
act brought federal force to school desegregation. Title IV empowered the Justice 
Department to bring desegregation suits.13 Title VI prohibited discrimination by 
government agencies that received federal aid.14 This provision became more potent 
the following year when Congress passed the ESEA, which greatly increased the 
flow of federal funds to school districts, thereby greatly increasing the costs of 
noncompliance with the desegregation mandate of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.15 In 
turn, the Justice Department and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
(HEW) increased enforcement pressure. Federal courts, especially those in the Fifth 
Circuit, whose jurisdiction included much of the deep South, grew tired of southern 
obstructionism and ruled more aggressively in favor of plaintiffs seeking 
desegregation.16 While only 2.3 percent of African American children attended 
integrated schools in the South in 1964, that percentage had increased to 12.5 percent 
in 1966.17 
The Supreme Court struck an important blow against Southern resistance to 
school desegregation in Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 
Virginia18 when it rejected the county’s freedom of choice plan, which nominally 
opened its historically all-white school to African American children, but effectively 
kept its schools segregated.19 The Court made clear that it would no longer tolerate 
delay in implementation of Brown II’s desegregation mandate, and that dual school 
systems must adopt plans that would create a unitary system speedily and 
effectively.20 By decade’s end, one third of Black school children in the South 
attended majority white schools.21 This trend would reach its peak of nearly forty-
                                                                                                                                         
 11 GARY ORFIELD, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN EDUCATION:  THE SCHOOLS AND 
THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 20 (1969). 
 12 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 28 and 
42 U.S.C.). 
 13 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000c-6 (West 2014).   
 14 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d (West 2014). 
 15 ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT OF 1965, 79 Stat. 27. 
 16 E.g., Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Sch. Dist., 348 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1965); U.S. v. 
Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, sub nom., Bd. of 
Educ. of City of Bessemer v. U.S. and Caddo Parish Sch. Bd. v. U.S., 389 U.S. 840 (1967).  
 17 JOHN MORTON BLUM, YEARS OF DISCORD:  AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY, 1961-
1974 196 (1991). 
 18 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
 19 Id. at 441. 
 20 Id. at 438-39. 
 21 GARY ORFIELD & ERICA FRANKENBERG, BROWN AT 60: GREAT PROGRESS, A LONG 
RETREAT AND AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE 10, Table 3 (2014).  
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four percent of Southern Black students attending majority-white schools in 1988.22 
Despite important victories in school cases elsewhere in the United States, 
desegregation numbers lagged in other regions compared to the South.23 
Despite this positive trend, the seeds of retrenchment and turnaround quickly 
began to appear. HEW guidelines that required real progress toward desegregation 
prompted mounting congressional opposition.24 The election of President Richard 
Nixon in 1968 deprived school desegregation advocates of a presidential ally. 
Judicial decisions also began to hint at turnaround. Northern plaintiffs had limited 
success establishing a right to integrated schools where school segregation was 
deemed not to be the result of intentional state action but, rather, the result of 
“private choice” regarding residential patterns.25 Civil rights advocates who pressed 
creative litigation strategies to broaden the definition of intentionality and to 
contextualize “private choice” found the courts to be generally unreceptive.26   
In 1974, school desegregation litigants suffered their first Supreme Court setback 
in the post-Brown era. In Milliken v. Bradley,27 the Court disallowed a multi-district 
remedy for Detroit litigants, notwithstanding the recognition that desegregation 
would be impossible if the remedy was restricted to the Detroit schools.28 In what 
Justice Marshall described as “a giant step backwards,” the Court essentially 
foreclosed almost any possibility for a multi-district remedy.29 Consequently, white 
flight to the suburbs, along with the decision to abandon the public schools, made 
integration more difficult and sometimes unachievable. In a series of decisions in the 
1990s, the United States Supreme Court held that once a school district had achieved 
unitary status, or, in other words, had eliminated the last vestiges of de jure 
segregation, the courts could no longer order the district to take steps to maintain 
                                                                                                                                         
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. at 18, Table 8 and Figure 3. That does not mean there was no progress in these 
regions.  Significant gains were made especially in border and western states. 
 24 ORFIELD, supra note 11, at 264-304. 
 25 THOMAS J. SUGRUE, SWEET LAND OF LIBERTY: THE FORGOTTEN STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL 
RIGHTS IN THE NORTH 477-81 (2009). 
 26 One judge who did adopt a more expansive approach was J. Skelley Wright in Hobson 
v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (1967), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1968). 
 27 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
 28 District Court Judge Steven Roth concluded that given the composition of Detroit’s 
school population, desegregation would be impossible under any plan limited to the Detroit 
school system. He then considered inter-district plans submitted by the parties and adopted an 
inter-district remedy. Bradley v. Milliken, 345 F. Supp. 914, 916-21 (E.D. Mich. 1972). In 
partially affirming the district court’s decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit stated that a denial of an inter-district remedy “calls up haunting memories of the 
now long overruled and discredited ‘separate but equal doctrine’ of Plessy v. Ferguson . . . . If 
we hold that school district boundaries are absolute barriers to a Detroit school desegregation 
plan, we would be opening a way to nullify Brown v. Board of Education . . . .” Bradley v. 
Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 249 (6th Cir. 1973) (en banc). For a discussion of Milliken, see 
SUGRUE, supra note 25, at 481-87. 
 29 Milliken, 418 U.S. at 782 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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integrated schools, even if release from existing court orders would result in 
resegregation.30 
Ever since, the momentum for desegregation has been backwards. According to 
the latest report of The Civil Rights Project at UCLA, the percentage of Black 
students in majority white schools in the South has fallen to pre-1968 levels.31 Using 
as one measure of school segregation the percentage of African American students in 
schools with a ninety to one hundred percent minority student population, the 
authors note that since 1991, every region of the U.S. has “experienced an increase 
in the percentage of black students in 90-100% minority schools . . . and the two 
most populous, diverse regions—the South and the West—have witnessed the 
sharpest increases in the shares of black students attending intensely segregated 
schools.”32 
The resegregation of our public schools is not simply a return to the past.  
Because of various demographic trends, today’s segregation is more complex than 
the segregation of the 1950s and 1960s. Substantial declines in the number of white 
students in the public schools since the late 1960s have been matched by substantial 
increases in the number of Latino students, who now constitute the second largest 
demographic group of school children.33 Segregation has soared during this period 
for Latino students, who often find themselves in the same schools as their African 
American peers.34 Finally, the issue of “double segregation,” the concentration of the 
poor in schools that are overwhelmingly Black/Hispanic, has become increasingly 
apparent as have the tragic consequences of segregation both by race and class.35  
B. Restoring Brown  
In order to better fulfill Brown’s promise, its fuller meaning must be restored and 
revitalized. Part of the difficulty of that task is the ambiguity of the case’s meaning. 
As any number of commentators have noted, it is not altogether clear what the basis 
for the Court’s holding in Brown was.36 As Professor Balkin notes, courts and 
advocates have repeatedly reinterpreted Brown, and its meaning has evolved and has 
been “domesticated” over time.37 
Part of Chief Justice Warren’s political genius was to build ambiguity into 
Brown, in order to achieve a unanimous opinion. At one point in the opinion the 
                                                                                                                                         
 30 Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 
467 (1992); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995). On the impact of these decisions, see 
ORFIELD & FRANKENBERG, supra note 21, at 27-31. The Court did further damage in 2007 
when it disallowed the use of race as a factor in voluntary school desegregation plans in 
Seattle and Louisville. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 
701 (2007). 
 31 ORFIELD & FRANKENBERG, supra note 21 at 10, tbl.3. 
 32 Id. at 18, tbl.8. 
 33 Id. at 6-8, tbl.1. 
 34 Id. at 15. 
 35 Id. at 15-16. 
 36 Balkin, supra note 9, at 1564. 
 37 Id. at 1563-68. 
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basis of the decision appears to be the harm that segregation does to African 
American school children.38 Elsewhere it appears that the basis might be the Court’s 
skepticism regarding a state’s use of racial classification in school assignments, 
implicitly requiring strict scrutiny review of the classification.39 Finally, the opinion 
suggests that education is so important that it should be treated as a fundamental 
interest or right and must be offered to all children on an equal basis.40 
The Court has tamed, and in the instance of regarding education as a fundamental 
right, rejected all of these rationales for Brown. We believe, nonetheless, that 
elements of each should be revived, if not as legal doctrine, as political and moral 
imperatives. For strategic reasons, given current legal and political constraints, and 
the current mood regarding educational policy, we believe that it is particularly 
important at the moment to emphasize Brown’s focus on the importance of education 
and on its promise of equal educational opportunity.41 
In a critical passage, Chief Justice Warren emphasized the necessity of education 
to equip every child to become a full participant in the civil, political, cultural, and 
economic life of the nation. Only with a quality education would that girl or boy be 
equipped to succeed as an adult. He wrote: 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local 
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great 
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the 
importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the 
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the 
armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is the 
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in 
preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust 
normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child 
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the 
opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has 
undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on 
equal terms.42 
Today’s children similarly will not grow up prepared for full participation as 
citizens, as members of civil society, and as contributors to a complex economy if 
their schools have not given them a quality education. Education enables the exercise 
of our fundamental constitutional rights and prepares us for participatory citizenship.  
Nevertheless, in a rejection of this thread of Brown’s reasoning, the Supreme Court 
has held that education, though important, is not a constitutionally guaranteed 
fundamental right.43 In so limiting Brown’s message, the Court has not foreclosed an 
argument grounded in this reading of Brown. It simply has closed one avenue, 
                                                                                                                                         
 38 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-94 & nn.10-11 (1954).  
 39 Balkin, supra note 9, at 1564-68. 
 40 Brown, 347 U.S. at 493. 
 41 In this regard, we are not alone. See, e.g., Taunya Lovell Banks, Brown at 50:  
Reconstructing Brown’s Promise, 44 WASHBURN L.J. 31, 40-44 (2004). 
 42 Brown, 347 U.S. at 493. 
 43 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1973). 
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litigation, for advancing these values of Brown. Brown’s moral authority, and the 
power of its argument regarding the necessity for equal educational opportunity 
remains potent in the political sphere and in the realm of education policy. 
Indeed, we believe that in enacting the ESEA of 1965, and especially its Head 
Start and Title I provisions, Congress and President Johnson were codifying the 
equal educational opportunity promise of Brown in federal law.44 
On its face, the ESEA seems unconnected to Brown except in the most attenuated 
ways. Given how little progress had been made in school desegregation in 1965 and 
how intense the fight over the schools remained at the time, it is perhaps surprising 
that neither the House nor the Senate Reports on the bill mentioned Brown or 
desegregation, especially given the leverage that it coupled with the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act would give the federal government to desegregate southern schools. Nor 
is there anything beyond stray incidental mentions in the congressional debate on the 
bill. Whatever the reason for this omission, finding an express connection to Brown 
in the legislative history is like finding a needle in a sea of haystacks. Nonetheless, at 
the very least, Brown belongs on the ESEA’s family tree. 
President Johnson, of course, saw the act as one of the cornerstones of his “war 
on poverty” and his Great Society. In that sense, legislation intended to expand 
educational resources for the poor was partly grounded in notions of creating more 
equal educational opportunities, though the lens through which the Act projected this 
was class, not race. 
Title I’s connection to Brown is obscured but real. First, in submitting the 
legislation to Congress, President Johnson explained the rationale for the bill in 
terms that closely echo Chief Justice Warren’s discussion of the importance of 
education in contemporary America. Like the Chief Justice, President Johnson 
emphasized the importance of education in training for citizenship and preparation 
for participation in civic life, including, as had Chief Justice Warren, preparation for 
military service. Both emphasized the necessity of education to fully participate in 
the world. Finally, as soon became very apparent, the ESEA, coupled with Title VI 
of the 1964 Act, the forcefulness of HEW guidelines and the deference of the federal 
courts to those guidelines became the engine of desegregation in the South.45  
The Act provided for a variety of programs ranging from the creation of Head 
Start to funding of educational research. By far the biggest financial commitment in 
the Act related to Title I, which provided for federal funds to public school districts 
to strengthen school programs for impoverished students. The initial funding scheme 
focused on targeting individual students as a means for avoiding a fight over funding 
of parochial schools. Over time the funding mechanism has changed, and schools 
with a high number of poor students are entitled to Title I funding. 
                                                                                                                                         
 44 Seen as a major legislative accomplishment in its time, the ESEA has since garnered 
criticism and praise. For two different critical analyses, see ALLEN J. MATUSOW, THE 
UNRAVELING OF AMERICA:  A HISTORY OF LIBERALISM IN THE 1960S 221-26 (1984); SANDRA J. 
STEIN, THE CULTURE OF EDUCATION POLICY 26-45 (2004). For a more positive account, see 
BLUM, supra note 17, at 178-79. Gary Orfield argues that desegregation “would have been 
impossible without the lure of money from the Elementary and Secondary Education Act.”  
ORFIELD, supra note 11, at 228. 
 45 ORFIELD, supra note 11, at 228; ROSENBERG, supra note 8, at 97-100. 
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III. WHAT ARE SCHOOL IMPROVEMENT GRANT PROGRAMS?  
Early in President Obama’s first administration, the President announced major 
changes for Title I schools via SIG funding grants.46 The administration intended the 
grants as a means to transform schools that serve students who are most 
economically disadvantaged and in need of a quality education.47 When announcing 
the grant application process in 2009, Secretary Duncan commented that, “[i]f we 
are to put an end to stubborn cycles of poverty and social failure, and put our country 
on track for long-term economic prosperity, we must address the needs of children 
who have long been ignored and marginalized in chronically low-achieving 
schools.”48   
SIGs are designed to fund significant reforms in “consistently lowest-achieving” 
Title I and Title I-eligible schools.49 SIG-funded schools receive up to $2 million 
annually for three years to improve student outcomes. The program, first authorized 
in Fiscal Year (FY) 2002, changed in FY 2009 due to significant increases in 
congressional appropriations. Congress increased SIG funding from $125 million in 
FY 2007 to $3.5 billion in AFY 2009 ($3 billion of which was provided under the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, the economic stimulus act). 
Schools started spending funds during school year (SY) 2010-2011.50 An additional 
$1.6 billion was appropriated in FY 2010-2012.  
The U.S. Department of Education awards SIGs to state education agencies 
(SEA) under § 1003(g) of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2002 ESEA.51 SEAs then 
award subgrants to local educational agencies (LEAs) or school districts within the 
state.52 Each state’s funding is determined by a formula based on their Title I 
allocation.53  Each SEA can then award these funds to districts that applied on behalf 
of some or all of their SIG-eligible schools.54  
A component of the state application process requires states to identify and 
prioritize eligible schools into three tiers: Tiers I, II, and III. Tier I schools receive 
priority for SIG funding and are the state’s lowest-achieving five percent of Title I 
schools (or five lowest-achieving schools, whichever number is greater) in 
                                                                                                                                         
     46  Arne Duncan, U.S. Sec’y of Educ., Turning Around the Bottom Five Percent (June 22, 
2009), available at http://www2.ed.gov/news/speeches/2009/06/06222009.html.  
 47 Id. 
     48  Id.   
 49 Michael Yudin, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Pol’y & Strategic Initiatives, Office of 
Elementary & Secondary Educ., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Dec. 8, 2010), available at 
https://www.rtinetwork.org/index2.php?option=com_content&task=emailform&id=345&item
id=66. 
 50 75 Fed. Reg. 66363 (Oct. 28, 2010).  
 51 NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT OF 2001, 115 Stat. 1425.  
 52 Id. 
 53 Steven Hurlburt et al., School Improvement Grants: Analyses of State Applications and 
Eligible and Awarded Schools, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. 2 (Oct. 2012), available at 
http://ies.ed.gov/ncee/pubs/20124060/pdf/20124060.pdf.    
 54 NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT OF 2001, supra note 51; see also 75 Fed. Reg. 66363, supra 
note 50. 
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improvement status.55 States can also identify “Title I-eligible elementary schools 
that: 1) are not higher achieving than any Title I school in Tier I; and 2) have not 
made adequate yearly progress (AYP) for at least two consecutive years or are in the 
state’s lowest quintile” (e.g., as reflected in proficiency rates).56 Tier II schools are 
Title I-eligible schools with performances comparable to Tier I schools that are 
among the lowest-achieving five percent of such secondary schools in the state or 
have had a graduation rate below sixty percent for a period of years.57 Tier III 
schools are not Tier I or Tier II schools but have been state-identified as schools in 
need of improvement, corrective action, or restructuring.58 States have the option of 
identifying a Title I-eligible school as Tier 3 when the school has not met the 
requirements to be Tier I or Tier 2, has not made AYP for at least two consecutive 
years, or is in the state’s lowest quintile based on proficiency rates.59 
Once schools eligible for SIG funding are identified, each school must choose 
one of four mandated school improvement models:  
 
1) Restart Model – The school must reopen under the management of a 
contractor, such as a charter school operator, management organization, or 
education management organization.  
 
2) School Closure Model – The district must close the school and students are 
transferred to higher-achieving schools in the district.  
 
3) Turnaround Model – The school’s current principal and a significant part of 
the teaching staff are fired. The district must hire a new principal who can 
retain no more than fifty percent of the existing staff.  
 
4) Transformation Model – Under the transformation model, an evaluation 
system for teachers and principals based on student achievement must be put 
into place; curriculum development for students must be made; professional 
development and training must also be implemented.60  
 
In addition, SIG schools are directed to provide effective leaders and teachers, a 
supportive and safe school environment, increased time for teaching and 
collaboration, operational flexibilities and capacity building; strong, aligned and 
responsive instruction; and family and community engagement.61 Since the 2010 
                                                                                                                                         
 55 To identify the lowest five percent of Title I schools, school districts must identify their 
persistently lowest-achieving schools based on schools’ absolute performance on state 
Language Arts and Math assessments and documented lack of progress over a period of time. 
High schools with low graduation rates are also eligible. Hurlburt et al., supra note 53, at 3.  
 56 Id. at 3.   
 57 Id.  
 58 Id. 
 59 Id.    
 60 Id. at 4; see also supra note 50. 
 61 An Overview of School Turnaround, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUCATION (Nov. 28, 2011), 
https://www2.ed.gov/programs/sif/sigoverviewppt.pdf. 
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modifications to the SIG program, states have awarded funding to two cohorts. In 
the first cohort, 1,00962 U.S. schools received SIG funding and 60063 U.S. schools 
received SIG funding in the second cohort. In the State of Ohio, forty-one schools 
were SIG-awarded in Cohort I and forty-five schools were SIG-awarded in Cohort 
II.64 
IV. HAVE SCHOOLS IMPROVED WITH SCHOOL IMPROVEMENT GRANT FUNDING? 
Because the increase in SIG funding has only been in place since 2010, results, 
either positive or negative, are only preliminary. Future study is necessary to 
establish whether the increased funding and school reform of Title I and Title I-
eligible schools have truly met Brown’s clarion call for equal educational 
opportunity. However, the preliminary results from the use of SIG funds to improve 
schools are not altogether promising, both nationally and in the State of Ohio. Since 
2010, SIG-funded cohorts of Title I and Title I-eligible schools have been monitored 
and tracked for school improvement. A 2012 report funded by the Institute of 
Education Sciences examined states’ Cohort 1 and 2 applications, and also examined 
school progress of SIG-funded schools across cohorts.65 In addition, the U.S. 
Department of Education released a summary of SIG National Assessment results on 
February 14, 2014.66  
The 2014 results suggest that SIG schools have made gains since being awarded 
SIG funding, particularly in math67 and reading.68 However, a careful analysis of this 
                                                                                                                                         
 62 Hurlburt et al., supra note 53, at 18. 
 63 Id. at 19. 
 64 OHIO DEP’T OF EDUC., Notification of SIG Awards: School Improvement Grant 1003g 
Award Funding, available at education.ohio.gov/getattachment/Topics/School-
Improvement/Transforming-Schools/FY11-Cohort-1-Awards-and-Applications.pdf.aspx; 
OHIO DEP’T OF EDUC., SIG Cohort 2 Budget (June 24, 2013), available at 
education.ohio.gov/getattachment/Topics/School-Improvement/Transforming-Schools/SIG-
Cohort-2-Budget-document-1-1.pdf.aspx.    
 65 Hurlburt, et al., supra note 53.  
 66 For Cohort I, there were 13,741 SIG-eligible schools, with 12,732 schools not awarded 
SIG funding. For Cohort II, there were 12,445 SIG-eligible schools (9,903 schools still 
eligible from Cohort I applications; 2,336 schools were newly eligible for SIG funding), and 
11,845 were not awarded SIG funding. Id. at 18. 
 67 For math scores in Cohort 1 the review reports, “189/485 schools (39%) show gains of 
10 percentage points (pp) or more since the pre-funding year (2009-10), 144 (30%) show 
gains from 1-9pp, 12 (2%) show no change, 113 (23%) show declines of 1-9pp, and 27 (6%) 
show declines of 10pp or more.” For math scores in Cohort II, “69/350 schools (20%) show 
gains of 10pp or more since the pre-funding year (2010-11), 128 schools (37%) show gains of 
1-9pp, 22 schools (6%) show no change, 109 schools (31%) show declines of 1-9pp, and 22 
schools (6%) show declines of 10pp or more.” U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., School Improvement 
Grant (SIG) National Assessment Results Summary: Cohorts 1 and 2, 3 (Feb. 14, 2014), 
http://www2.ed.gov/programs/sif/assessment-results-cohort-1-2-sig-schools.pdf.   
 68 For reading scores in Cohort I, “165/549 schools (30%) show gains of 10 pp or more 
since the pre-funding year (2009-10), 190 schools (35%) show gains of 1-9pp, 19 schools 
(3%) show no change, 135 schools (25) show declines of 1-9pp, and 40 schools (7%) show 
declines of 10pp or more.” For reading scores in Cohort II, “66/375 schools (18%) show gains 
of 10pp or more since the pre-funding year (2010-11), 166 schools (44%) show gains of 1-
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summary reveals several notable data limitations. A primary limitation is that only 
approximately 40% of Cohort I Sig schools and 30% of Cohort 2 SIG schools were 
included in the analyses. Moreover, the explanations provided for this limitation 
suggest problems with the data.69 Finally, states have different assessments and 
proficiency standards, thus compromising the ability to compare schools across 
states. Due to the large amount of missing data within the 2014 summary report, the 
results and implications associated therein with SIG funding are skewed and 
unreliable. 
The State of Ohio has released data on SIG-funded schools for FY 2011 and 
2012. For FY11, there were 41 identified SIG-funded schools in the first cohort. In 
the second cohort funded in FY 12, there were 45 newly SIG-funded schools, in 
addition to 40 renewed from the first cohort that were guided through the 
implementation and progress-monitoring phase for one of the four intervention 
models.70 Ohio SIG-funded schools overwhelmingly adopted the transformation 
model (n = 59, 69%), with the second-most popular choice being the turnaround 
model (n = 15, 17%). The restart model has only been implemented in one school 
(1%) and no school has adopted the school closure model as of July 2014.71 
For SIG-funded schools in Ohio that have adopted an improvement model, the 
intended goal to increase academic gains has not been met. In an examination of the 
limited data collected since the start of SY 2011-2012 and 2012-2013, SIG-funded 
schools have experienced decline in academic achievement. In SY 2012-2013, 
school achievement was measured using performance indicators, and the state gave 
schools grades of A-F on its report cards based on the number of indicators met.72 
                                                                                                                                         
9pp, 22 schools (6%) show no change, 95 schools (25%) show declines of 1-9pp, and 26 
schools (7%) show declines of ten percentage points or more.” Id. at 3. 
 69 The 2014 report included the following limitations for data: “a) significant state 
assessment or cut score changes during the grant years; b) more than one tested grade added 
or subtracted; c) no tested grades; d) school split or merger; e) missing proficiency rates; f) 
school closure; and g) data quality concerns.” Id. at 18. 
 70 See supra note 64; OHIO DEP’T OF EDUC., School Improvement Grant 1003g Awarded 
Funding-Cohort 1 FY12 Renewal Funding (May 9, 2012), available at 
education.ohio.gov/getattachment/Topics/School-Improvement/Transforming-
Schools/Cohort-1-FY12-Renewal-Awards.pdf.aspx. In 2013, the U.S. Department of 
Education announced that 11 states will receive funding to continue efforts to improve schools 
through the SIG program. Ohio will receive $20.2 million, more than double the grant to any 
other state. U.S. Dept. of Education Continues Funding School Improvement Grants, COUNCIL 
FOR EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN (Mar. 12, 2013, 12:43 PM), 
http://www.policyinsider.org/2013/03/us-dept-of-education-continues-funding-school-
improvement-grants.html.  
 71 See supra note 64. In Cohort II for Ohio, five schools (11%) did not adopt an 
intervention model due to: refusal of funding (n = 1), denial of eligibility or funding (n = 3), or 
school closure due to non-related SIG reasons (n=1). In Cohort II, six Tier III schools were 
awarded SIG funds to implement Tier III strategies, in lieu of adopting a turnaround model. 
Id. 
 72 Molly Bloom, 2012-13 Ohio School Building Report Cards, STATEIMPACT.ORG (Aug. 
22, 2013, 6:10 PM), stateimpact.npr.org/ohio/2013/08-22/2012-13-ohio-school-building-
report-cards/; Amy Hansen, 2013-14 Ohio School Building Report Cards, STATEIMPACT.ORG 
(Sept. 12, 2014, 3:15 PM), stateimpact.npr.org/ohio/2014/09/12/2013-14-ohio-school-
building-report-cards/.   
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Schools were also measured on gap closing using Annual Measurable Objectives 
(AMOs), which measured the academic performance of specific groups of students 
to determine if academic achievement gaps exist between groups of students.73 For 
SIG-funded schools in Cohorts I and II, only one school received a 
performance/indicator grade at the ‘B’ level. The grades for the remaining Ohio SIG-
funded schools ranged from ‘C’ to ‘F.’74 
The U.S. Department of Education, Office of Inspector General (OIG) has 
criticized Ohio SIG implementation.75 In 2012, the OIG released its final audit report 
of SIG grants awarded under the ARRA of 2009 to five states Florida, Georgia, New 
York, Ohio, and Texas.76 In the specific audit of the State of Ohio’s identification, 
monitoring, and appropriation of funds to SIG-eligible schools, the OIG found that 
Ohio awarded funds to LEAs that did not initially demonstrate the strongest 
commitment to using the funds to raise student achievement.77 It also found Ohio’s 
process for reviewing and approving LEA applications for SY 2010-11 inadequate to 
ensure that a SIG-eligible school could implement one of the four improvement 
models upon SIG reward.78    
V. TURNAROUND IN REVERSE 
If the preliminary results from the national and Ohio SIG cohorts are any 
indication, the paradox of progress continues to persist for economically 
disadvantaged and minority students. Not only is there an incomplete picture 
provided to illustrate student achievement gains made across U.S. SIG-funded 
schools, but the documented gains are also at best small and incremental. While 
there is limited data here to assert definitively that SIG’s do not aid schools in 
narrowing the achievement gap, there is cause for concern based on the data that has 
been collected. Further, there is some evidence that schools that have used a different 
strategy from the adoption of draconian turnaround models have produced better 
results.79 Moreover, there are lingering problems that serve to contradict both the 
                                                                                                                                         
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. This information was compiled by comparing the report cards with the lists of SIG 
grant recipients. 
 75 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SCHOOL IMPROVEMENT GRANTS:  
SELECTED STATES GENERALLY AWARDED FUNDS ONLY TO ELIGIBLE SCHOOLS (Mar. 2012), 
available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/oig/auditreports/fy2012/a05l0002.pdf.  
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. at 13-14. 
 78 Once the State of Ohio was informed of the audit results, plans were made to provide 
additional information. On September 15, 2011, the Department of Education granted a 
waiver that allows Ohio schools that started the implementation process during SY 2010-2011 
to further “develop evaluation systems during SY 2011-2012 and . . . pilot . . . [new systems] 
for all principals and teachers no later than SY 2012-2013.” Id. at 13. 
 79 In 2004, as the Superintendent of Chicago schools, Arne Duncan experimented with the 
turnaround model. The gains that resulted were modest. By contrast, a group of thirty-three 
high-poverty elementary schools that were community controlled significantly outperformed 
their turnaround peers. DIANNE RAVITCH, REIGN OF ERROR: THE HOAX OF THE PRIVATIZATION 
MOVEMENT AND THE DANGER TO AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 215-20 (2013). 
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enduring legacy of Brown and the Obama administration’s stated commitment to 
address the needs of students who have been marginalized historically.  
A. SIG turnaround models are not evidence-based and are costly to implement 
First, turnaround models have not been evidence-based, and this remains a 
problem source if SIG funding remains contingent upon adoption of one of four 
turnaround models.80 A study by Professors Tina Trujillo and Michelle Renée, found 
the research on turnaround models to be seriously flawed and not capable of 
supporting the claims of school reform advocates.81 Turnaround models for SIG-
funded schools also provide administrative obstacles. Since the initial announcement 
of SIG grants, schools in competition have had to quickly compile applications that, 
under the most benign school turnaround model, must include new teacher-
evaluation systems that are linked to student performance and include plans for 
hiring new personnel and/or firing principals and replacing them with new 
principals. This has created additional hurdles for rural and urban school districts 
that were already difficult to staff. Implementing an improvement model also 
requires technical and logistical expertise, which has meant that states receiving SIG 
funds have hired an array of costly consultants and turnaround specialists.  In 
Colorado, for instance, thirty-five percent of SIG funds went to consultants.82 The 
Brown decision noted that education is “the most important function of state and 
local governments,”83 yet current policy hinders state and local governments from 
fulfilling this commitment with the promotion of fatally-flawed transformation 
models that include large administrative costs for states and districts prior to any 
services for students. 
                                                                                                                                         
 80 As Robert Balfanz, school reform researcher and director of the Everyone Graduates 
Center at Johns Hopkins University stated, “[SIG’s are] not the Oldsmobile of comprehensive 
school reform . . . . [This is] a souped-up model coming hard and fast and getting big changes 
quick . . . . The big question is whether those changes are going to lead to improvement.” 
Alyson, Klein, What’s the Payoff for $4.6 billion in School Improvement Grants?, THE 
HECHINGER REPORT, Apr. 15, 2012. For a critical discussion of the lack of underlying 
evidence to support these mandated improvement models, see DIANE RAVITCH, THE DEATH 
AND LIFE OF THE GREAT AMERICAN SCHOOL SYSTEM: HOW TESTING AND CHOICE ARE 
UNDERMINING EDUCATION 223-88 (2010). 
 81 Michelle Renée & Tina Trujillo, Democratic School Turnarounds: Pursuing Equity and 
Learning from Evidence, NAT’L EDUC. POLICY CTR. 7-12 (2012), 
http://nepc.colorado.edu/publication/democratic-school-turnarounds. 
 82 It is difficult to find compiled data on consultant fees for SIG turnaround model 
implementation, because the federal government does not require reporting on this 
information, and most states do not report. According to an analysis published by The Denver 
Post in February 2012, in states that reported consulting fees an average of roughly twenty-
five percent of all SIG money went to private consultants. Jennifer Brown, Cost Doesn’t Spell 
Success for Colorado Schools Using Consultants to Improve Achievement, DENVER POST, Feb. 
19, 2012, http://www.denverpost.com/ci_19997418. 
 83 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1954). 
14https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol63/iss2/8
2015] TURNAROUND IN REVERSE 387 
 
B. SIG turnaround models weaken school and community ties 
Since the SIG application announcement in 2009, community and civil rights 
advocates have responded critically to the improvement mandate.84 Noting that the 
four mandated models have not been evidence-based, advocates have argued that 
SIG-mandated improvement models have rendered Title I Schools laboratories for 
testing school reform innovations.85 They also note that the current SIG model has 
not required or facilitated input from students, parents, members of the communities, 
or even educators in determining the model best suited for the school and 
community.86 Without access to quality schools with instruction, curriculum, and 
leadership based on evidence-based practices, nor the ability to participate in 
planning and implementing turnaround policies, these students and their families are 
effectively disenfranchised. This contradicts the legacy of Brown. 
Civil rights opposition to school turnaround models culminated in May 2014 
with a series of filed complaints under Title IV and VI of the Civil Rights of 1964 by 
community organizations in Chicago, Newark, and New Orleans, all members of the 
national Journey for Justice Alliance, with the Education Opportunities Section of 
the Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division (“DOJ”) and the Department of 
Education’s Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”). With the primary assertion that 
“children of color are not collateral damage,”87 the complaint alleged two related 
claims as to turnaround models used in the City of New Orleans: 1) Complainants 
challenged the State of Louisiana’s policy and practice of subjecting African-
American students to school closures at much higher rates than white students; and 
2) Complainants challenged the State’s policy and practice of discriminating against 
African-American students by failing to provide adequate educational alternatives 
once their schools were closed.88 Two of the schools in question were SIG-funded 
schools. 
                                                                                                                                         
 84 James Cersonsky, Fighting Education Shock Therapy, THE AM. PROSPECT, Jan. 10, 
2013, prospect.org/article/fighting-educational-shock-therapy. 
 85 Brown, 347 U.S. at 493-94. 
 86 Cersonsky, supra note 84; NAT’L OPPORTUNITY TO LEARN CAMPAIGN, Civil Rights 
Framework for Providing All Students an Opportunity to Learn through Reauthorization of 
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act,  
July 26, 2010, http://www.otlcampaign.org/resources/civil-rights-framework-providing-all-
students-opportunity-learn-through-reauthorization-el (joint statement from the Lawyers 
Committee for Civil Rights under Law, the NAACP, the NAACP Legal Defense and 
Educational Fund, Inc., the National Council for Educating Black Children, the National 
Urban League, the Rainbow Push Coalition, and the Schott Foundation for Public Education).  
 87 Letter from Journey for Justice Alliance to Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., and Arne Duncan, 
Sec’y of Educ. (May 13, 2014), available at 
http://b.3cdn.net/advancement/24a04d1624216c28b1_4pm6y9lvo.pdf. 
 88 The letter further notes, “[i]n essence, the State has robbed these children of their 
neighborhood schools while keeping them trapped in failing, underperforming schools. This 
complaint is also filed on behalf of students who would have attended these schools in the 
future had they not been closed, and the parents, teachers, and communities who have been 
impacted by these closures.” Id. at 3. 
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VI. CONCLUSION: GOING BACK TO CENTRAL HIGH 
As we consider struggling Ohio schools and the students who are forced to 
navigate them, perhaps we can learn something from the history of another Ohio 
school, Cleveland’s Central High School. 
When it opened its doors in 1846, Central was the first public high school west of 
the Alleghenies. Among its notable alumni are industrialists and politicians 
including, John D. Rockefeller and Marcus Hanna.89 Other alumni include: John P. 
Green, Cleveland’s first African American lawyer and its first African American 
elected official; Mary B. Martin, Cleveland’s first African American elected school 
Board member; former Congressman Louis Stokes; General Benjamin Davis, the 
first African American to achieve that rank in the U.S.; and African American poet, 
playwright, and novelist, Langston Hughes.90 
Langston Hughes, whose attendance more or less coincided with World War I, 
writes positively of Central High in his first autobiography, The Big Sea.91 He 
remembers it as a nurturing place where he was encouraged to find his voice as a 
poet. What made Central High work for Hughes? He describes an integrated school 
that largely reflected the changing demographics of Cleveland. Once the high school 
of Cleveland’s established elites, it had become predominantly populated by the 
children of recent migrants, whether from Southern and Eastern Europe, or the 
American South. The two largest groups were ethnic Catholics and Jews. A growing 
number of African Americans also attended, and their number would grow as the 
great migration increased Cleveland’s Black population and housing discrimination 
concentrated Cleveland’s African American population in Central High’s 
neighborhood.92 The faculty, as well, was somewhat integrated.93 
In addition to this sense of community and openness was a dedicated core of 
“wise and very good teachers,”94 and an intellectually engaged student body. Though 
the student body was overwhelmingly poor—Hughes notes that “there was no 
money for college in most of Central’s families”—the school was a good school 
with quality teachers, along with numerous other opportunities for growth through 
                                                                                                                                         
 89 Central High School, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CLEVELAND HISTORY, 
http://ech.case.edu/cgi/article.pl?id=CHS. 
 90 Id.; John Patterson Green, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CLEVELAND HISTORY, 
http://ech.case.edu/cgi/article.pl?id=GJP; Mary Brown Martin,  THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
CLEVELAND HISTORY, http://ech.case.edu/cgi/article.pl?id=MMB; Louis Stokes, BIOGRAPHICAL 
DIRECTORY OF THE U.S. CONG., http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=s000948; 
General Benjamin Oliver Davis Jr., U.S Air Force, http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/Biographies/ 
Display/tabid/225/Article/107298/general-benjamin-oliver-davis-jr.aspx.    
 91 LANGSTON HUGHES, THE BIG SEA 26-34, 51-53 (1940). 
 92 Id. at 29-30. 
 93 Hughes specifically mentions “Miss Chesnutt,” the daughter of African American 
novelist and essayist Charles W. Chesnutt, as one of his teachers. Id. at 28. Writing for 
Cleveland’s African American newspaper in 1915, Journalist Robert Drake noted that there 
were 30 African American teachers in the Cleveland school system who were dispersed 
throughout the system without regard to the racial composition of the schools. Robert I. 
Drake, The Negro in Cleveland, THE CLEVELAND ADVOCATE, Sept. 18, 1915.  
 94 HUGHES, supra note 91, at 28. 
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clubs and athletics.95 Hughes thanks several of his teachers expressly for their good 
humor and for particular important lessons and skills that they imparted. Most 
important, he thanks one English teacher who opened him up to what was then the 
shockingly new and controversial free verse of Carl Sandburg and who encouraged 
him to find his voice without regard to convention and to experiment in his own 
writing.96 It was, in sum, a place where students felt safe to experiment with ideas 
and their own voice, where they interacted freely with peers from various 
backgrounds, and where such experiences as mastering de Maupassant in the 
original French was thrilling.97 
How then can we recapture that sort of atmosphere and go back to Central High?  
How can we create or nurture schools for children, especially for minority and 
economically disadvantaged children that can foster the same love of literature and 
of ideas, and the same confidence to take chances and find one’s voice and one’s 
way that Central High gave to Langston Hughes? We begin by recognizing the 
enormity of the challenge and by looking both to the near and the long term. 
Regrettably, part of what Hughes experienced, and part of what Brown promised, a 
world where schools would not be designated by race, but simply as schools, is in 
the near-term unobtainable for many students under current legal doctrine. That does 
not mean that we do not have an obligation to find solutions where they are possible, 
whether through magnet schools, voluntary inter-district plans, or other creative 
means. It does mean, however, that in the near-term we should focus on Brown’s 
other two threads: recognizing and remedying school practices that do harm to 
minority students and delivering on the promise of equality of educational 
opportunity, regardless of a school’s demographics. Often that may require moral 
suasion rather than litigation. 
To begin with, the principle first do no harm should govern. As we have shown, 
the binding of SIG grants to supposed school reform models is not supported by 
educational research and threatens to make schools worse and to harm students and 
their communities. Turnaround models that threaten the massive firing of teachers 
simply for the sake of firing teachers do harm for appearances sake. A genuine 
atmosphere of learning will not emerge from the turnaround models attached to SIG 
grants. Defenders of Brown’s legacy must urge the Obama administration to restore 
the equal educational opportunity spirit to Title I by supporting these schools in need 
without unproven and counter-productive strings attached. 
Moreover, it is time to build a movement for fair and adequate school funding.  
Given Supreme Court precedent, such a movement must focus on legislation, not 
litigation. Professor Derrick Bell long ago argued that civil rights advances do not 
occur in America except at moments where the interest of a significant portion of the 
white majority converges with minority interests.98 For a long time our politics have 
reflected a lack of convergence. Perhaps we are entering a moment of renewed 
interest in equal educational opportunity. Not only do we profess deep concern about 
the ability of our students to compete within a global economy, but our political 
                                                                                                                                         
 95 Id. at 29-30, quoted text on 53. 
 96 Id. at 28-32. 
 97 Id. at 33-34. 
 98 Derrick A. Bell Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence 
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 524-25 (1980). 
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discussion has turned once again to the question of inequality, and our changing 
demographics create real possibilities for new coalitions. As we begin to see results 
from SIG funding, we may be ready for a more daring educational reform policy that 
promises real commitment to equal opportunity. Once we have made real short-term 
gains, perhaps we can also find ways to fully realize all of Brown’s promise. 
 
TABLE 1 
Ohio SIG-funded Schools - Cohort 1 (2010-2011) 
 
District 
Name Building Name Tier 
Total 
Enrollment FY 11 Budget FY 12 Budget  
FY 13 
Proposed 
Budget 
Intervention Model 
CPS Hays/ Porter I 434 1,086,347.80 897,215.09 913,079.71 Transformation 
CPS  Rothenberg Prep I 398 949,658.30 889,468.10 905,332.73 Transformation 
CPS South Avondale I 618 994,000.80 936,810.80 952,675.43 Transformation 
CPS William H Taft I 282 1,002,684.30 864,505.59 880,370.21 Transformation 
CPS Virtual II 300 797,726.30 567,889.08 581,189.01 Transformation 
CPS 
Woodward 
Career 
Technical 
II 997 2,000,000.00 1,103,959.37 1,127,641.69 Transformation 
CMSD Collinwood I 810 1,091,110.00 1,091,110.00 1,091,110.00 Turnaround 
CMSD East Technical I 749 1,091,110.00 1,091,110.00 1,091,110.00 Turnaround 
CMSD Franklin D. Roosevelt I 519 725,800.00 725,800.00 725,800.00 Turnaround 
CMSD Glenville I 907 691,110.00 691,110.00 691,110.00 Turnaround 
CMSD John F Kennedy I 867 1,091,110.00 1,091,110 1,091,110.00 Turnaround 
CMSD Lincoln-West I 1506 1,091,110.00 1,091,110.00 1,091,110.00 Turnaround 
CMSD Luis Munoz Marin I 754 451,750.00 451,750.00 451,750.00 Transformation 
CMSD Martin Luther King Jr I 238 584,250.00 584,250.00 584,250.00 Transformation 
CMSD Mary B Martin I 343 723,790.00 723,790.00 723,790.00 Turnaround 
CMSD Patrick Henry I 331 451,750.00 451,750.00 451,750.00 Transformation 
CMSD Stokes Academy I 501 451,750.00 451,750.00 451,750.00 Transformation 
CMSD Woodland Hills* I 303 723,790.00 723,790.00 723,790.00 Turnaround 
CCS 
Columbus 
Global 
Academy 
I 484 1,036,000.00 1,046,000.00 836,000.00 Transformation 
CCS Champion I 294 1,041,147.00 990,147.00 943,147.00 Transformation 
CCS 
Crittenton 
Community 
School 
I 125 246,750.00 204,750.00 198,750.00 Transformation 
CCS 
Linden-
McKinley 
STEM 
I 571 1,477,500.00 1,237,500.00 1,057,500.00 Transformation 
CCS 
ScholArts 
Preparatory & 
Care 
I 178 500,000.00 500,000.00 500,000.00 Transformation 
CCS Southmoor I 268 1,264,000 994,000.00 904,000.00 Transformation 
CCS Weinland Park I 396 825,100.00 818,400.00 744,400.00 Transformation 
CCS West I 1043 948,140.00 936,140.00 846,140.00 Transformation 
CCS Alum Crest II 126 774,900.00 750,900.00 710,900.00 Transformation 
SCSD Keifer Center I 215 1,657,000.00 1,537,000.00 1,150,170.51 Transformation 
LCS Progressive Academy II 396 1,756,847.55 1,150,170.51 1,150,170.51 Transformation 
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District 
Name Building Name Tier 
Total 
Enrollment FY 11 Budget FY 12 Budget  
FY 13 
Proposed 
Budget 
Intervention Model 
CHUH Bellefaire II 100 712,097.00 632,525.00 648,338.00 Transformation 
DPS Belmont II 808 350,537.00 230,537.00 350,537.00 Transformation 
DPS Dunbar II 586 350,537.00 350,537.00 350,537.00 Transformation 
DPS Meadow-dale HS II 611 350,537.00 350,537.00 350,537.00 Transformation 
YCS East II 983 805,820.00 611,147.00 611,146.00 Transformation 
YCS Odyssey II 100 913,166.00 723,043.00 723,043.00 Transformation 
MHCS Hoop III 908 1,327,441.00 1,100,000.00 900,000.00 Tier III SI Strategies 
XCS Cox III 309 1,030,504.30 753,554.00 753,554.00 Tier III SI Strategies 
XCS McKinley III 437 728,032.00 490,781.00 490,781.00 Tier III SI Strategies 
XCS Shawnee III 270 611,853.00 458,530.00 458,530.00 Tier III SI Strategies 
TLS Trimble III 339 105,680.00 96.050.00 62,550.00 Tier III SI Strategies 
TLS Trimble III 262 235,305.00 225,550 136,550.00 Tier III SI Strategies 
Key. * = SIG-funding not renewed after initial funding year. CPS = 
Cincinnati Public Schools. CMSD = Cleveland Municipal School District. 
CCS = Columbus City Schools. SCSD = Springfield City School District. 
LCS = Lima City Schools. CHUH = Cleveland Heights – University 
Heights City School District. DPS = Dayton Public Schools. YCS = 
Youngstown City Schools. MHCS = Mount Healthy City Schools. XCS = 
Xenia Community Schools. TLS = Trimble Local Schools.  
 
Source: Ohio Department of Education, 2014 
 
TABLE 2 
Ohio SIG-funded Schools - Cohort 1I (2011-2012) 
 
District 
Name 
Building 
Name Tier 
Total 
Enrollment 
FY 12 
Budget 
FY 13 Final 
Budget 
FY 14 
Budget 
Amount 
Intervention 
Model 
APS 
Buchtel 
High 
School 
II 873 1,200,930.49 1,318,966.00 769,100.00 Transformation 
APS 
Bridges 
Learning 
Center 
I 114 882,092.14 546,636.68 557,150.00 Transformation 
APS 
Akron 
Opportunit
y Center 
I 104 1,150,943.87 923,239.22 830,005.16 Transformation 
CCSD 
Canton 
City Digital 
Academy* 
II 145 335,171.00 Withdrew Application 
Withdrew 
Application Refused Funding 
CPS 
Western 
Hills 
Engineerin
g High 
School* 
II 125 1,700,000.00 Not Eligible  Not Eligible Not Eligible 
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District 
Name 
Building 
Name Tier 
Total 
Enrollment 
FY 12 
Budget 
FY 13 Final 
Budget 
FY 14 
Budget 
Amount 
Intervention 
Model 
CPS 
James N. 
Gamble 
Montessori 
High 
School 
II 275 1,540,798.22 1,249,500.00 786,450.00 Turnaround 
CMSD 
Paul 
Revere 
Elementary 
School 
I 329 806,940.00 763,610.00 466,500.00 Transformation 
CMSD 
Marion-
Sterling 
Elementary 
School 
I 356 806,940.00 710,610.00 672,790.00 Transformation 
CMSD Mary M Bethune I 342 1,129,650.00 1,098,112.00 890,500.00 Transformation 
CMSD School of One I 245 1,231,500.00 935,500.00 915,500.00 Turnaround 
CBA 
Columbus 
Bilingual 
Academy 
I 102 253,778.00 325,000.00 225,000.00 Transformation 
CCS 
Heyl 
Avenue 
Elementary 
School* 
I  1,405,201.00 Closed Closed Closed 
CCS 
Fairwood 
Alternative 
Elementary 
School 
I 394 1,257,933.00 875,000.00 765,500.00 Turnaround 
CCS South High School I 722 1,345,007.00 1,310,000.00 1,263,000.00 Restart 
CCS 
Lincoln 
Park 
Elementary 
School 
I 305 1,297,933.00 941,000.00 885,000.00 Turnaround 
DPS 
Westwood 
PreK-8 
School 
I 426 1,494,237.44 1,315,237.44 945,890.44 Transformation 
DPS 
Fairview 
PreK-8 
School 
I 460 1,054,857.13 1,054,857.13 722,620.04 Transformation 
DPS 
E.J. Brown 
PreK-8 
School 
I 398 920,236.89 947,928.00 746,896.95 Transformation 
DPS 
Thurgood 
Marshall 
High 
School 
II 599 1,495,320.00 1,395,320.00 1,139,820.00 Transformation 
ECCS Shaw High School II 1,054 1,459,400.00 1,295,000.00 775,000.00 Transformation 
EECHSD** 
East End 
Comm 
Heritage 
School 
I 84 353,925.25 530,397.00 450,000.00 Turnaround 
GLS Green High School II  497,775.00 482,275.00 427,365.00 Transformation 
LJA 
Lion of 
Judah 
Academy* 
I  221,385.00 Non Funded Non Funded Non Funded 
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District 
Name 
Building 
Name Tier 
Total 
Enrollment 
FY 12 
Budget 
FY 13 Final 
Budget 
FY 14 
Budget 
Amount 
Intervention 
Model 
LCSD 
Academic 
Enrichment 
Academy* 
I 210 961,713.42 Returned Funding 
Returned 
Funding Transformation 
MCS 
Mansfield 
Integrated 
Learning 
Center 
(Alternative 
School) 
II 147 913,019.80 816,608.34 839,479.00 Transformation 
MEA 
Mansfield 
Elective 
Academy* 
I 32 395,034.00 Non Funded Non Funded Non-funded 
OVA 
Ohio 
Virtual 
Academy 
I 12,616 687,000.00 658,418.12 1,000,000.00 Transformation 
RRCSD 
Roming 
Road 
Community 
School* 
I 467 975,450.00 753,900.00 Closed Transformation 
SLSD 
Southern 
Local Jr/ Sr 
High 
School 
II 414 1,225,941.65 1,134,000.00 755,400.00 Transformation 
Summit 
Academy 
Columbus 
Summit 
Academy 
Columbus 
I 59 532,902.00 413,785.00 388,408.00 Transformation 
Summit 
Academy 
Community 
School- 
Toledo 
Summit 
Academy 
Community 
School- 
Toledo 
I 129 438,723.00 368,743.00 256,900.00 Transformation 
Summit 
Academy 
Dayton 
Summit 
Academy 
Dayton 
I 104 350,588.00 350,063.00 290,188.00 Transformation 
Summit 
Academy 
Middle 
School- 
Columbus 
Summit 
Academy 
Middle 
School- 
Columbus 
I 52 300,773.00 227,771.00 196,094.00 Transformation 
Summit 
Academy 
Middle 
School-
Lorain 
Summit 
Academy 
Middle 
School-
Lorain 
I 87 237,092.00 190,123.00 254,605.00 Transformation 
Summit 
Academy- 
Lorain 
Summit 
Academy- 
Lorain 
I 76 425,559.00 282,505.00 312,327.50 Transformation 
Summit 
Academy- 
Youngstown 
Summit 
Academy- 
Youngstown 
I 193 311,721.00 326,146.00 292,844.43 Transformation 
TPS 
Glenwood 
Elementary 
School 
I 222 1,564,235.29 1,146,955.05 1,112,707.78 Transformation 
TPS 
Robinson 
Middle 
School 
I 201 1,480,073.35 1,108,335.14 996,418.65 Turnaround 
TPS 
(Jesup W) 
Scott High 
School 
II 544 1,148,771.90 1,035,662.63 928,489.13 Transformation 
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District 
Name 
Building 
Name Tier 
Total 
Enrollment 
FY 12 
Budget 
FY 13 Final 
Budget 
FY 14 
Budget 
Amount 
Intervention 
Model 
TPS 
Pickett 
Elementary 
School 
I 238 1,525,242.18 1,105,278.75 1,085,278.75 Transformation 
Tomorrow 
Center 
Tomorrow 
Center I  789,357.00 458,120.00 456,438.00 Transformation 
V L T 
Academy 
V L T 
Academy I 802 1,583,652.00 607,659.00 392,352.00 Transformation 
Virtual 
Community 
School of 
Ohio 
Virtual 
Community 
School of 
Ohio 
I 1,145 996,500.00 968,500.00 920,988.80 Transformation 
Virtual 
School-
house, Inc. 
Virtual 
School-
house, 
Inc.* 
I 396 264,869.40 239,827.00 Hold Transformation 
YCS 
Chaney 
High 
School 
II 390 1,850,000.00 1,159,688.10 800,000.00 Turnaround  
Key. * = SIG funding not renewed after initial funding year. APS = 
Akron Public Schools. CBA = Columbus Bilingual Academy. CCS = 
Columbus City Schools. CCSD = Canton City School District. CMSD = 
Cleveland Municipal School District. CPS = Cincinnati Public Schools. 
DPS = Dayton Public Schools. ECCS = East Cleveland City Schools. 
EECHSD = East End Community Heritage School District. GLS = Green 
Local Schools. LCSD = Lorain City School District. LGA = Lion of 
Judah Academy School District. MCS = Mansfield City Schools. MEA = 
Mansfield Elective Academy. MGSD = Mount Gilead School District. 
NR = Not Rated. OVA = Ohio Virtual Academy. RRCSD = Roming 
Road Community School District. SLSD = Southern Local School 
District. TPS = Toledo Public Schools. YCS = Youngstown City Schools.  
 
Source:  Ohio Department of Education, 2014 
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TABLE 3 
Ohio State Report Card (SY 2011-2012, SY 2012-2013) 
 
Building Name Achievements 
 Performance Index  
(SY 2011-2012, SY 2012-2013) 
 
Rating 
(SY 2011-2012, SY 2012-
2013) 
Hays/Porter 80.6/63.1 B/D 
Rothenberg Prep 79.0 /65.7         C/D 
South Avondale  91.1/71.6 A/C 
William H Taft 73.8/55.2 C/D 
Virtual 74.4/62.1 D/D 
Woodward Career Technical  77.5/62.1 D/D 
Collinwood 72.3/57.6 D/D 
East Technical 61.2/55.4 F/D 
Franklin D. Roosevelt 63.0/51.7 F/D 
Glenville 71.9/54.5 D/D 
John F Kennedy  68.6/57.1 F/D 
Lincoln-West 70.4/58.3 D/D 
Luis Munoz Marin 58.3/47.6 F/F 
Martin Luther King Jr NR/NR NR/NR 
Mary B Martin 62.4/50.0 F/D 
Patrick Henry 62.9/44.1 F/F 
Stokes Academy 61.2/48.4 F/F 
Woodland Hills NR/NR NR/NR 
Columbus Global Academy 68.5/56.1 F/D 
Champion 65.7/57.0 F/D 
Linden-McKinley 67.1/56.5 F/D 
Southmoor 75.5/NR C/NR 
Weinland 66.6/57.3 F/D 
West 80.4/57.7 C/D 
Alum Crest 66.6/50.7 C/D 
Keifer Center 54.2/54.2 F/D 
Progressive Academy 75.760.1 D/D 
Bellefaire NR/53.2 NR/D 
Scholarts Preparatory & Care NR/NR NR/NR 
Crittenton Community School NR/49.3 NR/F 
Belmont 81.7/63.7 C/D 
Dunbar 79.4/64.6 D/D 
Meadowdale HS 65.4/61.9 F/D 
East   69.7/61.0 F/D 
Odyssey     NR/NR NR/NR 
Hoop NR/NR NR/NR 
Cox NR/68.9 NR/D 
McKinley 92.2/NR A/C 
Shawnee 101.5/NR A/NR 
Trimble  NR/NR NR/NR 
Trimble NR/NR NR/NR 
Buchtel High School 80.4/63.6 C/D 
Bridges Learning Center 70.1/56.7 D/D 
Akron Opportunity Center 66.7/50.5 C/D 
Canton City Digital Academy  80.3/67.6 C/D 
Western Hills Engineering 
High School 69.5/43.3 F/F 
James N. Gamble Montessori 
High School 96.2/77.8 A/C 
Paul Revere Elementary School 61.7/48.9 F/F 
Marion-Sterling Elementary 
School NR/52.3 NR/D 
Mary M Bethune 63.7/51.2 F/D 
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Building Name Achievements 
 Performance Index  
(SY 2011-2012, SY 2012-2013) 
 
Rating 
(SY 2011-2012, SY 2012-
2013) 
School of One NR/58.9 NR/D 
Columbus Bilingual Academy NR/71.3 NR/C 
Heyl Avenue Elementary 
School 68.5/NR D/NR 
Fairwood Alternative 
Elementary School 63.6/52.9 C/D 
South High School 73.0/59.2 D/D 
Lincoln Park Elementary 
School 71.3/66.8 C/D 
Westwood PreK-8 School 58.1/49.0 F/F 
Fairview PreK-8 School 63.0/48.3 F/F 
E.J. Brown Prek-8 School 60.9/50.0 F/D 
Thurgood Marshall High 
School 78.8/67.5 D/D 
Shaw High School 82.2/66.9 C/D 
East End Comm Heritage 
School NR/42.9 NR/F 
Green High School   104.8/NR A/NR 
Lion of Judah Academy   NR/NR NR/NR 
Academic Enrichment 
Academy 66.1/64.5 F/D 
Mansfield Integrated Learning 
Center(Alternative School) 68.5/46.5 F/F 
Mansfield Elective Academy NR/48.2 NR/F 
Ohio Virtual Academy NR/73.0 NR/C 
Roming Road Community 
School NR/50.1 NR/D 
Southern Local Jr/Sr High 
School 94.9/81.8 C/B 
Summit Academy Columbus NR/52.6 NR/D 
Summit Academy Community 
School- Toledo NR/52.0 NR/D 
Summit Academy Dayton NR/55.8 NR/D 
Summit Academy Middle 
School- Columbus NR/53.7 NR/D 
Summit Academy Middle 
School- Lorain NR/56.2 NR/D 
Summit Academy- Lorain NR/63.9 NR/D 
Summit Academy- Youngstown NR/49.5 NR/D 
Glenwood Elementary School 63.5/58.6 F/D 
Robinson Middle School NR/NR NR/NR 
(Jesup W) Scott High School 70.8/57.4 D/D 
Pickett Elementary School 58.5/56.7 F/D 
Tomorrow Center    NR/NR NR/NR 
V L T Academy  NR/55.4 NR/D 
Virtual Community School of 
Ohio NR/66.9 NR/D 
Virtual Schoolhouse, Inc. NR/42.0 NR/F 
Chaney High School  NR/74.1 NR/C 
Key. NR = Not Rated.  
 
Source:  State of Ohio School Report Cards,  
available at http://reportcard.education.ohio.gov/Pages/default.aspx. 
 
24https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol63/iss2/8
